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Abstract  For the last decade, the Gibsonian concept of affordances has at-
tracted much attention within Human-Machine Interaction (HMI) and related 
research communities. The application of Gibson's ideas in HMI has lead to the 
notion of direct manipulation of interface objects. Previously, the focus has 
been on design for low level interaction modalities. To incorporate the concept 
of affordances in the design of human computer interaction it is necessary to 
systematically unravel affordances that support human action possibilities. Fur-
thermore, it is a necessity that Gibson's theory of affordances is supplemented 
by careful analyses of other human modalities and activities than visual percep-
tion. Within HMI two well established perspectives on HMI, Activity Theory 
(AT) and Cognitive Systems Engineering (CSE), have discussed such analyses 
and design of action possibilities focusing on providing computer support for 
work situations. Within these perspectives, the primary unit of analysis in HMI 
is human work activity and the socio-cultural context in which this activity is 
carried out. Thus, they emphasise the actors' purposeful activity as the most im-
portant design rationale. According to previous views in HMI, notably those 
that have been put forward by Norman and Gaver, affordances are in the fore-
ground, whereas the system or work area is in the background. AT and CSE 
share the view that the actors' perception of foreground and background shifts 
dynamically according to the actors' situational context in purposeful activity. 
AT and CSE follow the original notion by Gibson on the actor's dynamic shift-
ing between foreground and background of the environment. Furthermore, their 
work- and actor-centred approach to analysis and design of information systems 
opens up to an extension of Gibson's original ideas to cover deeper semantic 
and pragmatic aspects of the ecology of work, as compared with the previous 
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This report covers the research on affordances and HMI carried out in the pro-
ject on Theories and Methods within the Centre for Human-Machine Interaction 
(CHMI), during 2001. The research on affordances was initiated at a joint work-
shop on "Affordances, Actions, Signs and Constraints", held by CHMI at Mol-
slaboratoriet, 2000, which involved all partners of the centre. The major topics 
of this workshop are documented in the report "Theories and Methods" (CHMI, 
April 2000) by A.M. Pejtersen, S. Bødker & P.B. Andersen. The aim of the pre-
sent report is to revisit the concept of affordances in the light of activity theory 
and cognitive systems engineering. This research is carried out in the CHMI 
project on Theories and Methods.  
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ments by Klaus Bærentsen, Aarhus University, Denmark, Bonnie Nardi, Agilent 
Technologies, Palo Alto, USA, Wendy McKay, INRIA, Le Chesnay, France, 
Polle Zellweger, Xerox Palo Alto Research Center, USA and Raya Fidel, Uni-




In 1950 the American psychologist J. J. Gibson laid the foundation for the eco-
logical approach to psychology that is based on the concept of direct perception. 
According to Gibson, action and perception are linked through real world ob-
jects that afford certain forms of action possibilities for particular species or 
individuals. During evolution the perceptual apparatus of humans has become 
capable of picking up affordance information directly from the environment 
without further cognitive processing.  
For the last decade, the Gibsonian concept of affordances has attracted much 
attention within Human-Machine Interaction (HMI) and related research com-
munities. The application of Gibson's ideas in HMI has lead to the notion of 
direct manipulation of interface objects. That is, focus has been on design for 
low level interaction modalities. This has lead to many interface improvements, 
but this focus may also constrain the work within HMI in several ways. One 
example is dynamics, that we as humans are able during use to discover new 
action possibilities. Another example is individual physical and psychical dif-
ferences - as adults we perceive action possibilities that are hidden for the child. 
A third example is the significance of motivation - children who are not very 
hungry start to play with the food.  
To incorporate the concept of affordances in the design of human computer 
interaction it is necessary to in a systematic way to unravel these and other as-
pects of human action possibilities. Furthermore, it is a necessity that the theory 
of affordances is supplemented by careful analyses of other human modalities 
and activities than visual perception. Within HMI two well established perspec-
tives on HMI, Activity Theory (AT) and Cognitive Systems Engineering (CSE), 
have discussed such analyses and design of action possibilities focusing on pro-
viding computer support for work situations. 
Gibson worked in a psychological domain, and it is important to bear in mind 
that HMI is not psychology, and that it is not of primary concern to HMI re-
search how animals survive in their natural environments, neither is it of pri-
mary importance to understand what perception is to the human being. The pri-
mary importance lies in how we may understand the relationships between hu-
man beings and computer-based artifacts, and how we design affordances so as 
to improve on human computer interaction in work. This is not unproblematic, 
however, and many questions have to be answered:  
(1) How has Gibson's affordance concept been applied or extended within 
current HMI research, and what kinds of advantages and shortcomings have 
been identified? (2) Is there a contradiction in terms, with respect to Gibson's 
original theory of direct-perception-action, and recent developments in HMI 
research for affordances? (3) How can affordances in information systems ar-
ticulate semantic or pragmatic levels of the users' work problems and environ-
ment? In Bærentsens (2000) terms such conceptual affordance is often pre-
sented to the user through linguistic instruction explanation. On the other hand 
Bærentsen argues that many systems requires reading and symbolic processing 
and that many aspects of these often menu based systems would support user 
navigation far better if they instead offered graphical displays of dynamic in-
formation based on Gibson ideas. Would it possible in the light of AT and CSE 
to detect and explain conceptual affordances (or intentional affordances as we 
prefer to name them) is such a way that they can be delegated to a perceptual 
level? (4) How do AT and CSE view possibilities of going beyond the 'grand 
divide' between perception-action on the one hand and interpreta-
tion/understanding on the other hand? (5) How do AT and CSE view possibili-
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ties of extending the original concept to cover concepts like social interaction, 
cooperative work and inter-subjectivity in HMI design and evaluation?  
In the next chapter we introduce the basic concepts of affordances and discuss 
the use of the concept within HMI from a broad spectrum of theoretical per-
spectives, including ecological psychology, semiotics and epistemology. The 
following chapters present the AT and CSE approaches to the Gibsonian ideas. 
In section (5) we discuss and sum up on previous and current definitions and 
two of the approaches in CHMI. Section (6) concludes on the discussion and 
points at new questions, opportunities and conceptions of affordances. 
2 Background 
The concept of 'affordances' was originally coined by American psychologist 
J.J. Gibson (Gibson, 1979). The concept of affordances is an important element 
in Gibson's ecological theory of direct perception and action which constitutes 
an alternative to the information-processing paradigm that previously dominated 
research in the psychology of perception, in particular in the United States. Gib-
son's theory broke with previous dualistic conceptions of the relation between 
an actor and the environment, held by for instance cognitivism and behaviorism  
(Zaff, 1995). In Gibson's view, it is the very mutuality1 between actor and envi-
ronment that constitutes the basis for the actor's perception and action: 
 
"An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and 
helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the environ-
ment and a fact of behaviour. It is both physical and psychical, yet nei-
ther. An affordance points both ways, to the environment and to the ob-
server" Gibson, 1979, p. 129) 
 
Hence, the primary unit of analysis is not the actors nor the environment as dis-
tinct categories, but the total ecosystem of actors and environment. According 
to Gibson, affordances are material properties of the environment that can sup-
port the actor's existence and survival, such as fruits, vegetables, cattle and prey. 
That is, properties that can be acted upon, for instance be harvested, hunted, 
cooked and eaten.  
2.1 Gibson: affordances, perception and informa-
tion pickup 
But if the existence of affordances is vital to survival, then how can the actor 
perceive that the necessary affordances exist within the environment? Within 
this question is the ontological dimension of whether affordances exist per se, 
independently of the actor's perception. Furthermore, the question implies an 
epistemological dimension: how does the actor perceive an affordance, and how 
                                                     
1 The application of the term "mutuality" here should not be confused with the extended concep-
tion of  'mutuality' as a kind of singular "natural law" for construction of meaning and values, 




does the actor decide to perform or not perform an action relative to a perceived 
affordance. Gibson addresses this question from a primarily epistemological 
perspective when he says:  
 
"The central question for the theory of affordances is not whether they 
exist or are real but whether information is available in ambient [arrays] 
for perceiving them" (Gibson, 1979, p. 140) 
 
Gibson also uses the ecological concept "niche" to discuss the mutuality aspect 
of affordances:  
 
"The niche implies a kind of animal and the animal implies a kind of 
niche" Gibson, 1979, p. 128)." 
 
A certain niche is occupied or utilised by a certain species of animal. A niche 
refers to how an animal lives not where it lives. Gibson suggests that a niche is a 
set of affordances that constrains possible behaviour with respect to what we are 
able to do in a certain niche. He also notes that a niche with all its affordances in 
terms of physical, chemical and geological conditions of the surface of the earth 
existed before animal life began and that these had to be invariants for life to 
evolve.  
So, in addition to the tenet of mutuality between the actor and the environ-
ment, Gibson claims the necessity of available information about affordances in 
order for their perception and information pickup to occur. According to Gib-
son, the existence of such "collocative or exploratory contexts" for affordances 
is a crucial element of the ecology. Such contexts are in Gibsonian terms 'in-
variants' and 'invariant structures' (Gibson, 1979, p. 73). Because of the mutual-
ity of actor-environment, invariants are not perceived in the environment only, 
but are also perceived for the actor him/herself: 
 
"When a man sees the world, he sees his nose at the same time; or rather, 
the world and his nose are both specified and his awareness can shift. 
Which of the two he notices depends on his attitude; what needs empha-
sis now is that information is available for both" (Gibson, 1979, p. 116, 
our underlining) 
2.2 Affordances in HMI 
Gibson's notion of affordances has been subject to a great deal of interest by 
HMI research. Within this research, understandings of what affordances are and 
what they are for vary from design approaches, based exclusively on Gibson's 
introduction of the concept, to approaches that are in addition based on socio-
cultural and/or engineering frameworks to guide design and evaluation in HMI. 
Ecological psychologist W.W. Gaver has explored Gibson's original notion of 
affordances for the design and evaluation of user interfaces in HMI (cf. for in-
stance, Gaver, 1991). Gaver defines affordances as: 
 
 properties of the world that are compatible with and relevant for peo-
ples interaction. When affordances are perceptible, they offer a link be-
tween perception and action; hidden and false affordances lead to mis-
takes  (p.79).  
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Gavers affordance concept is put forward as an ecological alternative to the 
information processing paradigm in HMI research and development. Building 
from Gibson's linking of affordances with their immediate environment, i.e. 
how affordances must be collocated with the necessary information, or invari-
ants, in order to be perceived and acted upon by the user of an information sys-
tem, Gaver (1991) proposes the following taxonomy for affordances in user in-
terfaces: 
 
a. Perceptible affordances: 
This category of affordances in user interfaces is linked with perceptual 
information (or invariants). User interfaces can offer perceptible affor-
dances because they can offer information about objects that can be acted 
upon; example: a buttons pressability. However, one challenge here is 
that affordances in an artificial environment can be misperceived. If you 
try to act by pressing the button on a non-touchable screen by your finger 
nothing happens.  
 
b. Hidden affordances: 
This category of affordances covers existing affordances in an informa-
tion system, where no perceptual information is available in the interface. 
They then have to be learned.  
Gibson notes that usually the basic affordances of the environment are di-
rectly perceivable; eg.: "but we must, of course, learn to see what things 
really are-for example...that the helpful-sounding politician is really a 
demagogue" (Gibson , 1979, p 142) 
 
c. False affordances: 
This category covers perceptual information on a non-existing affor-
dance, upon which users mistakenly try to act. Again Gibson talks about 
misinformation for affordances. The affordances are there but are misper-
ceived. A much-cited example is the study of children's misperception of 
a visual cliff. According to Gibson, however, there is no such thing as a 
non-existing affordance. An affordance of an object, if perceived cor-
rectly, signifies the object.  
 
Gaver, as did Gibson, could be argued to follow a realist ontology in the sense 
that affordances are regarded as existent in the environment (= in Gaver's con-
ception, the information system), independently of perception. Gibson ad-
dressed the epistemological perspective of affordances through introducing the 
concept of invariants as contextual elements, or backgrounds for affordances. 
An information system is an artificial environment, constructed by designers, 
constituting a hypothesised or potential ecology within which human-
environment mutuality can be performed. Hence, Gaver's taxonomy of affor-
dances is an important framework to understand how affordances created for an 
artificial environment can function to couple the user with the system. The fo-
cus of Gaver's taxonomy is, however, not primarily on the mutuality, or the 
user-system relations, but rather on whether user-machine interactions are sup-
ported by affordances. 
Norman (1991, 1988) has more than anybody, through numerous practical ex-
amples pointed out how malfunction is easier demonstrated than well-
functioning, and how artefacts often stand in the way of human use, rather than 
they mediate it. Through his analysis of a variety of everyday artefacts, such as 
door handles and light switches, Norman has probably been the most influential 
promoter of Gibsons ideas in HMI despite his disagreement with Gibson's no-
tion of direct perception (Norman, 1999). Norman is in particular concerned 
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about a widespread application of the term "affordances" as denoting elements 
that are added to the interface, because, as he argues as does Gaver, affordances 
in information systems exist independently of what is visible on the screen. 
The computer system already comes with built-in physical affordances (..) 
Most of this affordance is of little interest for the purpose of the application un-
der design (Norman, 1999). Furthermore it is argued that symbols and con-
straints are not affordances, and that physical, logical and cultural constraints 
are more important for design, along with conceptual models. Conventions, he 
claims, develop, affordances do not. 
Norman's understanding of affordances is widespread in the HMI community. 
It implies a focus on artefacts as tools mediating or blocking mediation between 
user and environment, and is hence to some degree is in alignment with the AT 
conception of the relationship between user, system and work environment. 
Contrary to Norman, however, AT focuses on the cognitive development of the 
user as well as the dialectical co-evolution of user, system and work environ-
ment (Bødker, 1991, Nardi & O'Day, 1999). This last notion of dialectical co-
evolution is perhaps to some degree related to Gibson's notion of mutuality. 
However, Norman's conception of affordances as perceived properties of an 
artefact that indicates how it can be used could be argued to confuse affor-
dances with the information (=invariants) that specifies the affordances (see for 
instance, Flach, 1995; Amant, 1999). In Gibson's original terms, information 
pickup is active, direct and unmediated, and is the result of the optic flow of 
perceptual information (invariants) in the environment.  
Furthermore, Norman's concept of HMI is based on the notion of matching 
between at least two distinct models or representations involved. These models 
include the user's knowledge structures (in Norman's terms, represented inter-
nally as "cultural constraints", "conventions" and "logical constraints") and the 
system's structures (in Norman's terms, represented via a "conceptual model"). 
Thus, he claims that "when you [the user] learn not to click unless you have a 
proper cursor form, you are following a cultural constraint". When Norman ar-
gues that cultural constraints and conventions develop, but that affordances do 
not, the socio-cultural contexts are simultaneously placed as something external, 
i.e. outside the confines of the system's domain, and by extension, the designer's 
domain. Furthermore, because of the lack of an explicit explanation or formula-
tion of how such stable entities perform - or rather, where they perform (within 
the users' mental models, or within the system) - , affordances are implicitly 
relegated to a kind of "no-man's land", with little to offer/afford. This observa-
tion is in alignment with the earlier mentioned objection by Flach (1995) that 
Norman confuses affordances with invariants. In addition, this means that the 
factors constituting the background within which mediation by technology per-
forms is not accounted for. Following for instance Latour (1994), Norman could 
be said to operate with fixed concepts of subject (user) and object (system), 
while at the same time excluding their explicit and implicit goals, which in itself 
makes it difficult to account for the mediating role of technology/information 
systems.  
Contrary to Norman, Gaver (1991) finds that culture, experience and inten-
tions are indeed entangled in the user-system interaction. Where Norman re-
duces such entanglement to a mechanistic "match" between system and user 
representations, Gaver finds that such contexts can function to highlight certain 
affordances. Gaver does not consider the learning dimension or the develop-
ment in cognition for the user exploring and applying a system, however. Nor-
man tries to explain such possible evolution as the result of internal mental 
processing on the part of the user. In either case, it could be argued that Gaver's 
as well as Norman's affordance concepts are rather short term, and considering 
affordances as more or less static surface phenomena. 
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2.3 Intuitive interfaces 
Building from Gibson's original notion on the importance of available informa-
tion for the perception of affordances, Bærentsen (2000) has introduced the 
concept of intuitive interfaces, defined as 
 
 [an interface] which is immediately understandable to all users, without 
the need neither for special knowledge by the user nor for the initiation of 
special educational measures (Bærentsen, p. 32) 
 
According to Bærentsen, the interface must provide an at least minimal under-
standing of what the system affords. Contrary to Gaver's application of Gibson's 
notion of invariants as being broadly defined as "available information", 
Bærentsen applies Gibson's notion of "ecological optics" (Gibson, 1979, p. 65). 
The basic idea of ecological optics is that affordances are perceived as invariant 
information in an ambient optic array at a point of observation. An array is an 
arrangement of optical information that has an invariant structure. The point of 
observation is surrounded completely by this optic array - it has no boundaries. 
The point of observation is a position in ecological space that consists of 
places-location or positions where an observer might be and could make an ob-
servation. 
Bærentsen suggests that spatial metaphors are useful devices for representing 
the users task space and their intuitive exploration, and that the perception of 
affordances are dependent on the degree to which users are able to know or feel 
(intuition) "where they are" in ecological space. This concept of affordances and 
invariants is to some degree related to Heidegger's concept of "thrownness", 
applied by Winograd & Flores (1986) as one important hermeneutic/ phenome-
nological concept for HMI design and evaluation. Bærentsen's concept of intui-
tive interfaces also links Gibson's notion of "ecological optics" with a learning 
aspect, inspired by activity theory, notably Vygotsky's concept of the "zone of 
proximal development" (Vygotsky, 1980). Thereby Gibson's original concept of 
ecological optics, coupling the actor's perception of dynamic visual environ-
ments with locomotion in that same environment, is to some extent expanded to 
cover more interpretative or perhaps semantic aspects of the user-interface mu-
tuality, through the explicit introduction of a learning dimension. This latter di-
mension to some degree corresponds to the notion of adaptation and adaptive 
interfaces, developed by the approach of ecological interface design, EID 
(Vicente, 1999; Rasmussen, Pejtersen & Goodstein, 1994). 
Contrary to Gaver and Norman, Bærentsen explicitly addresses the dynamic 
aspect of the affordance concept, for instance through underlining the impor-
tance of what space (invariants) and time means for the learning aspect of HMI. 
Thus, Bærentsen's view of affordances and invariants implies a more long-term 
view of technology, as seen from the users' as well as the designer's point of 
view. Bærentsen's concept of intuitive interfaces does not opt for a quick fix of 
malfunctioning user interfaces through affordances as add-on elements to the 
interface. The focus is on the understanding of the user's exploratory context in 
space and time, following a more hermeneutic approach to system design (Wi-
nograd & Flores, 1986), and providing important and innovative ideas for how 
the designer can articulate such context in the interface itself. The question of 
how design can support the users' understandings and learning in the long term 
is also addressed by Rasmussen, Pejtersen and Goodstein (1994) and Vicente 
and Rasmussen (1992). Bærentsen in particular mobilises the principle of situ-
ated action (Suchman, 1987) and the theory of cultural historical psychol-
ogy/AT (Leont'ev, 1978)), but also mentions the ecological approach (Vicente 
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& Rasmussen (1992) as a source of inspiration to design principles for intuitive 
interfaces.  
As mentioned, Bærentsen's design principles involve suggestions for spatial 
metaphors to articulate invariants, but in addition a mapping of events2 (or 
scenes) within which the user can situate her actions and choices. Through in-
troducing actors and events and the possible couplings of such elements as units 
of analysis for design, it could be argued that the intuitive approach to some 
degree comes from a perspective seeing the artefact as "text", or narrative. The 
design principles hence incorporate a requirement of syntagmatic analysis for 
the work problem that a particular technological product is intended to address. 
It can be argued that the approach of intuitive interfaces incorporates high level 
cognitive notions of narrative units and 'the grammar of plot' (following the 
principles of, for instance, Propp, 1958), which is very much related to Ander-
sen's research in narrative multimedia design (Andersen, 1993). 
A further design principle works from the coupling between user, system and 
work task, mapped through a three level model of activity motive ('why?'), ac-
tion goal ('how?') and operation conditions ('what?'), inspired by Leont'ev 
(1978) and Rasmussen (1986). While these theories of work activity have dif-
ferent historical, disciplinary and cultural roots, they are in alignment with re-
spect to the assumption that the actor/user has intentions and goals, and that 
these intentions and goals are situated. That is, the users' action and intentions 
are not determined solely by outside factors (=socio-cultural determinism) nor 
by a priori "cognitive plans" (=mentalism). For the designer, this situated per-
spective means s/he does not perform from an "all-knowing" position, but is 
inscribed within the system as kind of set designer for the narratives created by 
the user. In short, through the introduction of design principles building on high 
level syntagmatic analysis of the users' domain, as well as addressing the se-
mantic/pragmatic levels of work, Bærentsen's approach could be regarded as 
extending Gibson's original notion of direct perception-action for design to 
cover more high level cognitive levels, perhaps even taking a leap to from per-
ception to meaning or interpretation. 
2.4 The deep structure of affordances 
In their introduction of the theoretical framework for ecological interface de-
sign, Vicente and Rasmussen (1992) suggest principles for the creation of de-
sign maps to cover sets of events as seen from the users' point of view. Based on 
interviews and participant observation of operators' work within the tightly cou-
pled work domain of process control, Vicente and Rasmussen identified a num-
ber of recurring events and properties of the work environment which they then 
mapped towards Gibson's concepts of affordances and invariants. The coupling 
of the users' perception-action and understanding of events was addressed 
through positing two basic theoretical concepts, developed by Rasmussen 
(1983; 1986), i) the abstraction hierarchy and ii) the skills-rules-knowledge 
model. The generic abstraction hierarchy, which is applied to map the work 
domain from physical properties to high level goals, has five levels. Rasmussen 
and Vicente mapped Gibson's affordances towards the abstraction hierarchy, 
and reached an overall generic classification of affordances into three catego-
ries: why, what, and how. For instance, a surface can provide locomotion 
(what), with biking as means (how), and pleasure or survival being the highest 
                                                     
2 See for instance, Stoffregen 2000a, for a discussion of how affordances are sets of events,  
thereby to some degree supporting Bærentsen's design principle of how to provide the user 
with an organized set of scenes for  navigation in a narrative space of events.  
Risø-R-1287(EN) 13 
goal (why). Thus, the hierarchy functions to guide the actor from overall views 
of action possibilities to details of the environment.  
The skills-rules-knowledge taxonomy (Rasmussen, 1983) was originally put 
forward as an explanatory framework for describing in what way an actor inter-
prets information: i) as signals (skills), ii) as signs (rules) and iii) as symbols 
(knowledge level). From this generic model of the users' levels of cognitive 
control the designer can consider what kinds of affordances and invariants, as 
organised in the abstraction hierarchy for the domain, should be available to the 
user. The overall design idea was to provide the user with the highest possible 
freedom of action possibilities through articulating what physical -> goal-
directed relations in the environment (=power plants etc.) constrain behaviour. 
As Vicente (1999) points out, the EID design principles originally introduced 
by Vicente and Rasmussen (1992) did not address loosely coupled work do-
mains. Loosely coupled work domains are characterised by, for instance, a high 
degree of task uncertainty (for instance, case handling) and a high degree of 
freedom and diversity of cognitive control among the actors involved (for in-
stance, information searching in libraries). For loosely coupled domains with a 
high degree of task uncertainty, implying a high degree of strategic dependence 
on human experts, the actors' knowledge level, their learning, cognition, strate-
gies and tasks, are crucial units of analysis (cf. also, Whitley, 1983).  Pejtersen 
has demonstrated this in the design of a multimedia information retrieval for 
fiction mediation in Danish public libraries (Pejtersen, 1980). An important fea-
ture of this latter system is visual access to information about the topical content 
of fictional works, through a variety of classification schemes. These schemes 
function as semantic maps to guide the user to the contents of the books, by ad-
dressing several levels of semantic information, ranging from high level inten-
tional values of users and authors to more low level attributes of readability and 
physical form. Thus, the means ends abstraction hierarchy was extrapolated to 
more deep level connotative information than was previously addressed by the 
EID approach, together with the ecological principle of direct perception-action 
in the graphical interface. 
2.5 Current interdisciplinary discussions of Gib-
son's affordance concept 
Vicente, Rasmussen, Pejtersen and Bærentsen's research implies an extension of 
Gibson's notion of affordances and invariants for the design of complex socio-
technical systems to cover more connotative or semantic aspects of the user-
system ecology, as compared with, for instance, Norman and Gaver. Is there a 
contradiction in terms, with respect to Gibson's original theory of direct-
perception-action, i.e. action unmediated by high-level representations like lan-
guage or symbols, and such recent developments in HMI research for affor-
dances? Ongoing discussions within ecological psychology might suggest that 
previous understandings of Gibson within their field have focused too narrowly 
on unmediated action. Behaviour or actions are not only products of perception 
but also products of cognition, decision-making, intentions and values. Gibson's 
theory of direct perception action has functioned as a radical break with cogni-
tivism as well as behaviourism. Hence, Gibson's theory of affordances has been 
mobilised by researchers within psychology and within the HMI community 
(notably, by Gaver) as a distinct and fairly radical perspective, coming from a 
more or less explicit agenda of breaking with previous research paradigms in 
HMI.  By sticking to a conviction that affordances are linked with direct percep-
tion-action only, little room is left for current and future discussions of how to 
work with expanding, adapting and developing the affordance concept by the 
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HMI research community. It is likely that one important background for the re-
cent openings to new understandings and extensions of Gibson's original affor-
dance concept within the community of ecological psychology is connected 
with the increasing cross-disciplinary applications of Gibson's theory, for in-
stance for HMI, architecture, town planning etc. (see for example Reed, 1996, 
for examples of cross-disciplinary applications of the concept). 
Recently, ecological psychologist Stoffregen (2000a) has suggested an exten-
sion of the affordance concept to cover more high level, or in Stoffregen's 
terms, second order categories, using examples such as 'food' (denotating a set 
of affordances like fruits, vegetables etc.) and 'friend' (connotating someone that 
can be counted on in emergency). Stoffregen couples the notion of second order 
affordances to Wittgenstein's concept of language games (Wittgenstein, 1953). 
In this context, it is interesting to observe that Gibson also refers to Wittgen-
stein's philosophy of language, notably to explain how information pickup oc-
curs through invariant structures of the ecology:  
 
To perceive an affordance is not to classify an object.The theory of af-
fordances rescues us from the philosophical muddle of assuming fixed 
classes of objects, each defined by its common features and then given a 
name. As Ludwig Wittgenstein knew, you cannot specify the necessary 
and sufficient features of the class of things to which a name is given. 
They have only family resemblance. But this does not mean you cannot 
learn how to use things and perceive their uses. You do not have to clas-
sify and label things to see what they afford (Gibson, 1979, p. 134). 
 
Furthermore, Gibson's original concept of affordances has been subject to dis-
cussion within semiotics, notably by ecological psychologist and philosopher J. 
Pickering (1999). From a semiotic point of view, in a Peircean sense, Gibson's 
original concept of affordances could be related to Peirce's concept of firstness, 
or in generic philosophical terms, first order expressions. At this level of in-
stinctual and functional awareness by the organism, affordances of the organ-
ism-environment ecology could be regarded as types of signs to which the or-
ganism adapts its actions and (biological etc.) evolution: 
 
"Affordance, the directly perceivable meaning of the environment, is .. 
inherently attached to action. It implies a mutualist ontology in which 
stable relations between co-evolved things is taken as being as real as the 
things themselves  In Peirce's terms, affordance is a sign for which the 
organism acts as interpretant to produce action in a given situation as 
the object. Thus organisms do not merely respond to stimuli, but act on 
the basis of meaning." (Pickering, 1999, our underlining) 
 
Within Peirce's triadic sign concept is a phenomenology comprised of three lev-
els, where the first level (firstness) is not only a priori existing physical proper-
ties of the environment (corresponding to 'object' in Peirce's model), but also the 
outcome of actions carried out in the environment. The second element of 
Peirce's triadic sign concept is the representamen, corresponding to some extent 
to Peirce's concept of 'secondness'. The third element of Peirce's sign model, the 
interpretant, to some degree corresponds to Peirces concept of thirdness. 
Peirces three phenomenological levels are built into his theory of sign forma-
tion: 'representamen', 'object' and 'interpretant'. Peirce's three phenomenological 
levels to some degree correspond with the levels of work activity addressed by 
activity theory and ecological information systems. 
Risø-R-1287(EN) 15 
Pickering's semiotic definition of 'affordances' is related to other semiotic 
theories of self-organizing systems, on how organisms evolve in mutuality with 
the environment through action and adaptation. For instance to concepts like 
'autopoiesis' and 'structural coupling', coined by Maturana (see for instance, 
Maturana & Varela, 1980), and applied in HMI research by, for instance, Wino-
grad and Flores (1986). However, Pickering's discussion is primarily intended 
as a contribution to ongoing discussions within ecological psychology on break-
ing with radical Gibsonean thinking, including suggestions of possible exten-
sions of the affordance concept to address broader cognitive, semantic and 
pragmatic issues. 
Is it possible that such recent interpretations and suggested extensions of Gib-
son, as stipulated by Stoffregen and Pickering, within the field of ecological 
psychology, open up to renewed discussions and considerations of whether af-
fordances in information systems can articulate semantic or pragmatic levels of 
the users' work problems and environment?  
How has Gibson's affordance concept been applied or extended within current 
HMI research, and what kinds of advantages and shortcomings have been iden-
tified, in particular by the Activity Theoretical (AT) approach the Ecological 
Interface Design (EID) approach. 
Norman and Gaver do not address high level cognitive issues, for instance ac-
tivity, culture, language and knowledge, in their application of the affordance 
concept for HMI. How do AT and EID view possibilities of going beyond the 
'grand divide' between perception-action on the one hand and interpreta-
tion/understanding on the other hand?  
Gibson's affordance concept does not readily generalise to social interaction, 
cooperative work and inter-subjectivity. How do AT EID view possibilities of 
extending the original concept to cover such factors in HMI design and evalua-
tion? Where do affordances stop and social interactions begin? Or, rather, what 
are the affordances in social interactions? 
3 Activity theory and affordances 
Activity theory perceives the relation between human and environment as dy-
namic, makes us focus on biological, historical and individual development. 
Activity theoretical HCI has come to focus on: 
• Analysis and design for a particular work practice with concern for qualifi-
cations, work environment, division of work, etc. 
• Analysis and design with focus on actual use and the complexity of multi-
user activity. In particular the notion of the artifact as mediator of human 
activity is essential. 
• Focus on the development of expertise and of use in general. 
• Active user participation in design and focus on use as part of design. 
 
Activity theoretical HCI offers a set of conceptual tools, rather than ready-made 
techniques. This chapter will demonstrate these concepts, along with some se-
lected techniques that we have successfully applied. 
Activity theory and Gibsonian thinking share the basic idea that perception is 
not afferent, that it is connected with action. Only through acting do people per-
ceive their environment. Activity theory insists that our action and perception 
are mediated by a variety of tools. Activity theory gives a useful handle for un-
derstanding the mediators, and how they are shaped, in a dialectical relationship 
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with the changing practice of use. Accordingly mediation has been the key point 
of interest to activity theoretical HCI. At the same time Leont'ev, in his analyses 
of human development, points out that historically mediation was preceded by a 
development phase characterised by direct perception in ways that are rather 
similar to what Gibson describes, and that this phase still exist in all of us, as a 
basis for our mediated encounters with the world (Bærentsen, personal commu-
nication).  
Activity theory takes purposeful acts as the basic unit of analysis of artifacts. 
Thus, we have to study what happens when users focus on their job (or other 
purposeful act) while using an artifact. According to Leont'ev (1978), human 
activity can be analysed into a three-level hierarchy of activity, action, and op-
eration, each of which reflect the objective world (see figure 1). Activity is di-
rected to satisfy a need through a material or ideal object. The subjects reflec-
tion of (including expectation to) this object is the motive of the activity. Hu-
man activity is carried out through actions, realising objective results. These 
actions are governed by the conscious goals of the subject. Goals reflect the ob-
jective results of action. Actions are realised through series of operations; each 
triggered by the conditions and structure of the action. They are performed 
without conscious thinking but are oriented in the world by a non-conscious 
orienting basis. Goals are different from the motive, but still realising it are only 
possible in human activity; in animals goal and motive are always the same.  
 
 
Type of activity Directed at Analysis 
Activity Motives Why something takes place 
Action Goals What takes place 
Operation Conditions How is it carried out 
Figure 1. Different aspects of the activity structure 
 
In line with the above description of human phylogenetic development, Gib-
sonian thinking relates to the level of operations in activity theory: Many com-
mon operations (..) are learned as a barely ever conscious habit. With them, 
there is nearly no use of precise discursive rules for consciousness in the sense 
of reflexive self-regulation. A good example is when we learn to ride a bike, 
where little of what it takes are rules. In contrast, activity is developed histori-
cally, socio-culturally and micro-socially. Actions are developed ontogeneti-
cally, deliberately and habitually. (Raiethel & Velichkovsky, p. 201). Wittgen-
stein mentions the example of children playing train. To children in a western 
society this activity is motivated by the analogy to real trains moving about. To 
children of a remote tribe (as Wittgenstein frames the example) they can cer-
tainly learn the movements of the game, but the game never make sense to them 
in the same way (Wittgenstein, 1953) 
3.1 The social-historical dimension 
Activity theory insists that Gibsonian thinking is lacking a clear understanding 
of the relations between the social-historical dimension and the evolutionary-
biological aspects of the concrete sensori-motor operations realising the actions 
of the individual (Bærentsen, personal communication). In relation to human-
computer interaction, this means that activity theory insists on taking a wider 
look at use, that detailed interaction between a human being and a computer or 
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other artefact cannot be understood without understanding the purpose of the 
activity.  
The question is would it nonetheless be possible to analyse the social-historical 
dimension on the basis of the affordances of an artefact? Are these affordances 
not a reflection of the social-historical conditions of operations, that is opera-
tions that used to be carried out by a human being, but now is objectified in the 
artefact? The saying  to he who has a hammer, everything looks like a nail 
illustrates how our seeing and doing is dependent on our tools and on the socio-
historical development. 
Let us take an example from the activity theoretical analysis of the history of the 
development hand weapons (Bærentsen, 1988). Before the beginning of medie-
val times, soldiers and hunters primarily used bow and arrow. The bow and ar-
row let you focus on the target without thinking too much on the tool in your 
hand. After a while you would not even notice it - it becomes a true part of your 
body. You will now be able to kill with your eyes. From a Gibsonian point of 
view the arrow affords aiming by looking along the arrow at the target. After 
the invention of gunpowder, a new generation of hand weapons began to de-
velop. The principle for these weapons where though more or less the same as 
for the bow and arrow. Some sort of energy is released on an object that then is 
thrown in a certain controlled direction. The advantage of the new weapons was 
that the acceleration of the bullet is far greater than the acceleration of an arrow 
and thus it became possible to shoot at a greater range. But the affordance of 
aiming somehow got lost in the first generations of hand weapons. The soldier 
will still be able to aim by looking along the rifle barrel at the target, but to fire 
the weapon attention was attracted towards getting the gun powder to explode. 
Then hopefully the target had not moved while the soldier was engaged in a 
series of sensory-motor operations to light the gunpowder. In the next genera-
tion of weapons these operations have been captured and fixated as a mecha-
nism in the hand weapon that allows a persons full concentration on hitting the 
target- the affordance of aiming is once again available (Bærentsen, 1988).  
These aspects of the history of the development of hand weapons are related to 
the discussion of the affordances of human made artifacts. Gibson (1979, 130) 
states that: "Man made artifacts can be seen as efforts to change and expand 
affordances of the environment. In changing the substances and shapes of the 
environment humans have made more available what benefits him and less 
pressing what injures him." It is a benefit to be able to shoot at a greater range, 
but it could be dangerous not being able to hit the target. Incorporating certain 
human operations into the weapon solved this conflict. In activity theoretical 
terms the hunters' action realises the goal to kill the prey, aiming is a condition 
for the operation of firing the weapon at the exact right time without any further 
reasoning. In Gibsonian terms the prey affords to be eaten and the weapon af-
fords aiming at the prey. We have not even mentioned the motive here. In Gib-
sonian terms the motive would be something like hunger. In Activity Theory the 
motive is of a higher order for example the survival of the tribe.  
The example could lead us to think that it could be possible to unravel socio-
historical dimensions of affordances with a point of departure in activity theory, 
but we off course need many more examples and analyses to say anything cer-
tain about this.  
3.2 Learning 
In the Gibsonian world, learning is about increasing differentiation. Activity 
theory is likely to argue that the world in which we make the differentiation 
changes as well, as a consequence of our actions. Furthermore, learning as not 
18 Risø-R-1287(EN) 
only enriched repertoires of operations the development of the individual rep-
ertoire of actions as well as the wider human development, are equally essential 
parts of the development of human activity, human skills.  
On the other hand this does not mean that activity theory could not be used in 
detecting and explaining the role affordances in learning. Engeström (1990) has 
from an activity theoretical perspective studied students learning and perception 
of an abstract astronomic phenomenon - the phases of moon. The study showed 
that students when asked what causes the different phases of the moon tend to 
answer incorrectly that the different phases of the moon are caused by the 
shadow of the earth. Engeström hypothesises that the cause for this misconcep-
tion should be found in cultural artefacts like textbooks and instructional prac-
tices in the educational system. Engeström shows that in fact the reason for mis-
learning the concept is due to poor diagrammatic illustration that lacks a dy-
namic model and ecology of the real phenomenon in terms of distances between 
and sizes of the sun, moon and the earth. In addition, the third dimension is 
missing - the diagrams cannot show the depth of the space in a proper way.  On 
the basis of this "affordance" based analysis (he does not mention affordances in 
the book) Engeström concludes that students should be given the possibility to 
engage in research like activities to observe and experiment with real life phe-
nomena. Another conclusion could be that the activity based analysis proved 
useful by pointing at a lack of affordances for learning a naturally observable 
phenomenon. 
Bødker (1991) summarises investigations and discussions in the human activ-
ity literature about how human beings learn, more specifically how they develop 
their repertoires of operations, as follows: 
1. Activity on material objects cannot be learned without practical experience.  
2. Activity that has an abstract goal, such as solving a mathematical problem, 
is easier learned and carried out in connection with physical objects than with 
representations of such. Learning with representations is in turn easier than in 
connection with language, which is easier than activity that is totally based on 
mental reflection. For example, adding is first performed by children by count-
ing physical objects, then they move on to master adding based on figures, then 
to a state where adding works best if they are allowed to talk, and so forth. 
3. When operationalisation takes place, it is at first very situation specific, but 
as the human being meets new conditions, the variation of situations that can be 
handled by operations grows. 
4. For the novice, the activity takes place at a very detailed level of actions, 
where each action is consciously planned. With experience, the human being 
moves toward an operationalised totality. This is achieved through generalisa-
tion, through operationalisation of planned actions, and through abbreviation, an 
operationalised skipping of certain operations due to the conditions for them 
and knowledge about the result. For example, for communication partners dis-
cussing a certain calculation, when the result of multiplication by one is known, 
instead of having to carry out the operation, then the context is obvious; in car-
pentry, when sandpapering is not necessary to smooth the wood because you 
already did well with the plane. 
5. The person is brought down from one level of competence to another either 
due to some pedagogical questioning of the former operations and their condi-
tions or because she is trying to apply old operations to the new artifact and is 
encountering a breakdown. The pace at which she can be brought back to her 
old level of competence or beyond depends on the artifact, on how much she 
can rely on the generality of her operations, on the type of education given, and 
on whether she can make use of experiences from other types of activity.  
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6. The use of an artifact is, if the artifact works well, operationalised. Ideally, 
learning starts out with actions toward the artifact and ends without those ac-
tions. 
With respect to learning the question of when exactly an affordance is an af-
fordance for the first time for a given individual could be raised. Do affordances 
gradually expose themselves to us or do they suddenly expose themselves to us 
just as snap of the fingers dependent on individuals different physical and men-
tal capabilities?  
Kaptelinin (1996, pp. 62) shows that when we learn to use symbolic tools we 
go through three developmental stages: 
1. The initial phase, when performance is the same with and without a tool 
because the tool is not mastered well enough to prove any benefits, 
2. The intermediate stage, when performance is superior to unaided per-
formance, and 
3. A final stage with and without the tool but now because that the tool me-
diated activity is internalised and the external tool no longer needed. 
 
The problem here is that some external tools are not fully internalised. It is 
rather difficult to imaging a person hammering a nail with an internalised ham-
mer. The last developmental stage only holds for tools that can be completely 
symbolised. 
On could speculate whether this Vygotskian inspired view on learning could 
be applied to the notion on learning computer-based affordances as well. And in 
general what could Vygotsky's concept of "the zone of proximal development" 
tell us about this issue? 
One answer would be that it seems to be that different affordances plays dif-
ferent roles through the leaning process - that new affordances will appear and 
others fade away alongside perceiving the new ones. Moreover other persons 
matter in learning to perceive new affordances - Robinson Crusoe is fiction.  
3.3 Tools as functional organs 
Activity theoretical HCI has insisted on understanding actual interaction, actual 
artefacts in use, not in isolation. Gibson, in contrast, notes that we perceive ob-
jects, though when we look at objects we perceive their affordances, not their 
qualities. It is striking how the analyses presented in the literature (e.g., Nor-
man, Gaver) look at objects as a detached reflection, not as artefacts in use. As a 
quality criterion, activity theory insists that the artefact should not impose itself 
on the user in use. Yet the user cannot achieve the particular goals without the 
artefact, and in this sense the artefact is an important part of shaping use.  
Activity theory also accepts that breakdowns happen, where the transparent 
interaction through the artefact stops, and where the user is confronted with the 
artefact as an object. A well-designed artefact, activity theory insists, supports 
recovery from such breakdowns. Simultaneously, such breakdowns are open-
ings for learning, be this learning to enrich the repertoire of operations of the 
user, or learning in terms of reconceptualising the meaning of the artefact. In 
comparison, Gibsonian thinking is indeed not concerned with the latter of the 
two. 
Gibson hypothesises that objects have some sort of universal function or 
meaning. From an activity theoretical perspective the functions or meanings of 
tools and other objects are actively created through interacting with the envi-
ronment. Kaptalinin (1996) argues that the use of affordances implies that the 
initiative is taking by an external situation. Operations are not just triggered by 
conditions, but are part of the general structure of actions. 
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Gibson does not extend his theory much to human-made artifacts, but talks 
about natural substances, surfaces or mediums of the environment like air or 
water. Or he talks about landscapes like mountains, plains, swamps, rivers and 
forests. The exception is relatively small and portable tools that when used is no 
longer part of the environment but part or extension of the actor's body.  
This is in line with the activity theoretical concept of functional organs (Le-
ont'ev, 1981). A functional organ is a tool extension of the body. These tools 
can both be external like scissors that turn the hand into a cutting organ or inter-
nal like a mental model or action plans. Another point is that Gibson does not 
take into account that the tools embody operational forms of the history of hu-
man social activities and natural laws and that the affordance may be a reflec-
tion of this historical dimension. From an opposite perspective the question 
would be if not the conditions for the operations includes affordances - that af-
fordances are inseparable from the original operational conditions and that these 
affordances have become part of new functional organ.  
3.4 Different foci in use activity 
Bødker (1991) has characterised different focuses in the computer application 
use activity: 
The physical aspects-support for operations toward the computer application 
as a physical object. The physical aspects are the conditions for the physical 
handling of the artifact. The human adapts to the forms and shapes of the arti-
fact. A maladaptation might prevent the forming of certain operations. 
The handling aspects-support for operations directed at the computer applica-
tion. A breakdown in these operations will make the user focus on the artifact. 
The handling aspects are the conditions for the transparency of the artifact that 
allow the user to focus on the "real" objects and subjects of the activity. This 
type of operation can be conceptualised (for instance in breakdown situations), 
as the user being forced to conduct actions toward the artifact as an object. 
The subject / object -directed aspects- the conditions for operations directed 
towards object and subjects that we deal with "in" the artifacts through the arti-
fact. Different subject / object-directed aspect relate to different subjects or ob-
jects, but it is also part of these aspects to support the shift between subjects / 
objects. This means that although it is possible to talk generically about subject 
/ object-directed aspects, in a specific analysis it will make sense to identify 
such aspects for each relevant subject or object. 
The question is how do these focus dimensions relate to the concept of affor-
dances. Would it be possible to speak of three dimensions of affordances that 
can support the different focuses of the use activity presented in the above char-
acterisation. That is, it could be worthwhile to explore such notions as physical 
affordances, handling affordances, and subject / object -directed affordances? 
The latter being the most difficult to analyse.  
In general, with respect to learning and the most of discussion above, we 
would conclude that activity theory seem to offer more distinctive and situated 
concepts. More or less because activity theory encompasses such concepts as 
motives, purposeful activities and personal development and does not consider 
"statically" concepts like affordances which are there once and for all. 
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4 Cognitive Systems Engineering and 
affordances 
Ecological Interface Design (EID) and Ecological Information Systems (EIS) 
are a response to the HCI models proposed by Schneidermans syntactic-
semantic model (Shneiderman, 1987) and Normans gulfs of evaluation and 
execution (Norman, 1986). These models have the value of generality, but are 
limited with respect to work domains where i) actors naturally reason at various 
levels of abstraction and ii) decide and act at multiple levels of cognitive control 
(Rasmussen 1988, Vicente and Rasmussen, 1989). The theories of EID and EIS 
are based on field studies of real life work domains and are inspired by Gibson's 
theory of direct perception-action. The skill-rules-knowledge (SRK) model de-
scribes an actors level of cognitive control during work. The means ends ab-
straction hierarchy describes the different levels of information content about 
the work domain and constitutes a multilevel and generic map to support an 
ecological coupling for the actor with the work domain through its implementa-
tion as a representation of its multiple levels of information. The content of in-
formation refers to different, but interrelated, abstraction levels that encompass 
goals and constraints, priorities, work functions, work processes and work ob-
jects, including people and tools. The relationship and mutual dependency be-
tween these two models provide the foundation of the theory of EID and EIS, 
together with Gibson's ecological theory of perception-action. 
In the following, the two core theories for EID and EIS are presented and dis-
cussed. The first theory is the skills-rules-knowledge model that was developed 
as a cognitive theory for information processing and perception as these activi-
ties were unfolded by operators during field studies of process control. The sec-
ond theory is the means-ends model that was developed for stratified mapping 
of the work domain of process control, and which was later mapped towards 
Gibson's hierarchy of affordances with the aim of describing important stable 
attributes of work domains as invariants and invariant structures.  
4.1 Skills Rules Knowledge (SRK) 
Rasmussen (1983) introduced the SRK model as a tool for systematic descrip-
tion of how human intervention performs in the environment of high risk work 
domains, such as power plant control. It breaks with previous models for human 
performance, that were predominantly based on quantitative decision theory 
(see for instance, Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). A crucial limitation of the quan-
titative decision models, and in particular those that were previously created for 
global application, is that when implemented in real life environments, they 
tend to constrain or "anchor" the actors' decisions to particular previous out-
comes from their choices of action, rather than pointing to alternative solutions. 
On the contrary, the SRK model is intended to dynamically direct the actors to 
choices of alternative actions that may be more appropriate to solve a particular 
work problem and hence also support a learning dimension. SRK follows the 
tenet by Rosenbluth and Wiener (1943) that human behavior is teleological by 
nature, but breaks with the underlying behaviourism in their view that human 
action is carried out as a result of stimuli, such as immediate feedback from the 
environment, articulated, for instance, as signals:  
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At a higher level of conscious planning, most human activity depends 
upon a rather complex sequence of activities, and feedback correction 
during the course of behavior from mismatch between goal and final out-
come will therefore be too inefficient, since in many cases it would lead 
to a strategy of blind search. Human activity in a familiar environment 
will not be goal-controlled; rather it will be oriented towards the goal and 
controlled by a set of rules which has proven successful previously (Ras-
mussen, 1983, p. 2). 
 
Rasmussen's SRK model was stipulated within the information-processing 
paradigm. The primary purpose of the model is not to put forward a new theory 
of human cognition in a broad sense, but to explain, model and represent how 
actors read and interpret interface displays, and how this relates to the actors' 
situational work performance. Thus, SRK is founded on field studies and obser-
vation of actors in real life work environments in addition to theoretical frame-
works for understanding human cognition and decision-making, including for 
instance Polanyi (1966). An important tenet of SRK is that human perception, 
interpretation and action rely on mental models, representing the information 
content about the work domain as well as the rules or strategies for action in the 
domain. Furthermore, SRK distinguishes between the following categories of 
actors' performance: skill-, rule- and knowledge-based performance. The fol-
lowing description of the SRK model retains Rasmussen's original formulations 
of human perception, interpretation and action (Rasmussen, 1983; 1986). The 
model describes the actors' performance patterns in different situations, ranging 
from familiar to unfamiliar circumstances within which action occurs. 
Skill based behaviour 
Skill based behaviour corresponds to sensory-motor performance during actions 
that, after the statement of a conscious intention, take place without conscious 
control. This type of performance is characterised by smooth, automated and 
highly integrated patterns of behaviour. The sensory input is not selected or ob-
served, as the senses are only directly towards the aspects of the environment 
needed to update and orient subconsciously the internal map, or mental model. 
In Rasmussen's terms: "The man looks rather than sees" (Rasmussen, 1986, p. 
101). In some cases, performance is one continuous whole or "flow", in particu-
lar for performance requiring high-level control, such as musical performance 
or bicycle riding, where the actor's skilled performance is due to the ability to 
compose from a large repertoire of automated subroutines. In Gibsonean terms, 
this could correspond with a situation where the actor perceives (hears, sees, 
feels) and acts directly in mutuality with the environment. Rasmussen, however, 
inserts the interpretative layer of an internal "dynamic world model" that is un-
consciously updated by the actor. The purpose of updating the internal dynamic 
model is for the actor to "modulate" the skill in general terms. For instance, the 
musician in a symphony orchestra continually adapts her performance in a 
modular way to fit the acoustics of the concert hall, the performance of other 
musicians and the conductor.  
Rule based behaviour 
For rule-based behaviour, the composition of a sequence of subroutines is typi-
cally consciously controlled by a stored rule or procedure. This rule or proce-
dure is either derived from previous experience, or is communicated as rules of 
thumb or heuristics for problem solving and planning. The performance is goal-
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directed. The boundary between skill-based and rule-based behaviour is not dis-
tinct, however. The skill-based performance occurs without the person's con-
scious attention. That is, for skill-based behaviour like bicycle riding, knowl-
edge is typically tacit and embodied, and hence difficult for the actor to formu-
late explicitly. Conversely, high-level rule-based behaviour is in general based 
on explicit know-how. The rules can be communicated from one person to an-
other, although the cues for releasing a rule may be difficult to describe. For 
instance, when the bicyclist books a ferry, s/he may know beforehand about 
possible routes and prices during a particular season of year, and may have 
knowledge of possible alternatives in case her favourite route is booked up. The 
actual cues for releasing the rule of "book favourite route - procedure" may be 
difficult to describe for the bicyclist, however. 
Knowledge based behaviour 
Contrary to skill-based and rule-based behaviour, coming from the actor's ex-
pertise or from communication with other actors, knowledge based behaviour 
usually occurs in situations where no know-how or rules for control are avail-
able from previous experience. "Knowledge" is then, in this context, defined in 
a restricted sense as "possession of a conceptual, structural model". In this situa-
tion, the goal is explicitly formulated, based on an analysis of the environment 
as well as the overall aims of a person. This behaviour can only be activated 
when meaningful, relational structures of information are available. For in-
stance, the bicyclist may find out that all ferries are booked up. Because the bi-
cyclist possesses a conceptual model of the system of bridges and public trans-
portation in her surrounding area, she may decide to explore, by calling friends 
and travel agencies, or consulting maps, whether it is possible to cross the water 
via a bridge, on bike, walking or by train.  
In dynamic and complex work domains with a large number of unfamiliar 
situations, actors will tend to depend on knowledge based behaviour. Experts in 
a familiar situation will tend to rely on rule based behaviour. Since the con-
scious processing is effective to cope with unanticipated problems and the sub-
conscious processing is effective to cope with familiar events, shifts among the 
different types of behaviour will frequently take place. The three types of be-
haviour are complementary and they are all necessary to fulfil actors goals. 
Hence, most tasks will usually require simultaneous interaction and considera-
tion of all three types of behaviour. According to Rasmussen (1986) there is a 
dynamic world model that mediates the shift and focus of these three types of 
behaviour: 
 
A kind of dynamic world model is necessary to account for control of re-
sponses to the environment that are too fast to allow control by simple 
perceptual feedback. Often-cited examples are fast sequences in sport, 
musical performance, etc., and the quick draw of western gunmen, which 
has recently been used for military training (reference omitted). To serve 
this purpose, it is necessary that the internal dynamic world model simu-
lates not only the behavior of the environment, but also of the body; i.e. it 
simulates the interaction (Rasmussen, 1986, p. 80) 
 
The citation suggests that the dynamic world model would be derived and de-
veloped in the situational coupling between the actor and the environment. 
Thereby, Rasmussen approaches the Gibsonean principle of mutuality, with the 
particular purpose of understanding and modelling human work performance. 
Gibson, however, did not assume the existence of an interpretative layer, such 
as an internal world model, for mutuality to occur. According to Gibson, per-
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ception and information pick-up is direct and unmediated. According to Ras-
mussen, the coupling between actor and environment is always mediated. This 
does not mean that the internal representation is static. If for some reason, the 
demands of a situation change in a substantial way, the skills that the actors has 
developed will no longer be appropriate. Then the actors dynamic world model 
is no longer appropriate and she is not able to act. This is where the advantage 
of conscious, knowledge based processing comes in. Using the analytical ap-
proach based on structured knowledge, a change in the task situation can be ac-
commodated. Activation of one or the other type of behaviour will also depend 
on the form in which the information is presented, perceived and interpreted by 
the actors: as symbols, signs or signals.  
4.2 Affordances are structured: developing the 
early principles of Ecological Interface Design 
(EID) 
The aim of ecological interface design is to create transparent interfaces that 
support direct perception at the level of the actor's perception of affordances, 
while at the same time supporting the levels of cognitive control (skills, rules, 
knowledge) at which the actor chooses to perform. The mapping across inter-
faces that will support the actor's dynamic switching among levels of focus and 
control must support control of movements, acts and plans simultaneously. To 
do this, the EID designer creates an artificial ecological environment that im-
plements the invariants and invariant structures of the environment as functional 
properties of the technological system.   
The EID approach to designing and implementing the functional properties of 
the system is based on the means-ends model to capture affordances and invari-
ants of the work domain and the interrelationships between these invariants. 
Furthermore, the approach builds on SRK to model the actor's levels of cogni-
tive control, that is, the way that the actor can choose between the action possi-
bilities and objects (invariants) in the environment and explore these from the 
perspectives of means and ends. 
Rasmussen and Vicente initiated this research to address the problem of de-
signing interfaces that would support actors' exploration of systems without im-
posing normative constraints for navigation, as for instance found in previous 
guidelines for direct manipulation interfaces. Furthermore, the intent was to ex-
plore how Gibson's theory of direct perception would be applicable for com-
plex, high-technology work domains, such as process control, which had not 
been addressed by previous research on affordances for HMI. At the time where 
Rasmussen and Vicente (1989; 1992) initiated their work on applying Gibson's 
theory of direct perception-action to interface design, the concept of affordances 
had already been introduced to HMI, notably by Norman (1988 et passim). 
Prior to the formulation of the EID approach, affordances in HMI and ecologi-
cal psychology were typically studied as single isolated entities (e.g., pass-
throughable, sit-onable, graspable). Rasmussen and Vicente worked from the 
assumption that in any realistic situation, a large number of inter-related affor-
dances are available to the active organism. Their core assumption was that af-
fordances are structured and that this structure may convey important goal-
relevant information. Figure 2 shows Rasmussen's and Vicente's mapping of 
Gibson's affordances towards the means-ends hierarchy (Rasmussen, 1986). 
The results indicated that affordances could be structured as a means-ends hier-
archy, and thereby function as a mechanism to cope with the complexity of the 
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natural environment. The means-ends model has five levels, ranging from 
physical properties to high level goals and intentions.  
The interrelationships between affordances and the five levels are articulated 
as "why", "how" and "what". These questions are generic articulations of the 
different kinds of views that an actor can have on the possibilities of the envi-
ronment. For instance, any activity (such as biking: how), can be chosen as well 
for its goal (getting to a destination in a pleasurable and quick way: why) as for 
its physical properties (the bike is available, the road is even, not too hilly, and 
it is not raining too hard: what). The three levels of "what", "how" and "why" 
also correspond to the way that the designer can capture and articulate the ac-
tors' knowledge and intentions in a computational system. In AI terms, "what" 
corresponds to declarative knowledge, "how" to procedural knowledge, whereas 
"why" corresponds to meta-knowledge. From the actors' point of view, the three 
levels are not absolute in any sense, but rather can "slide" up or down. The most 
important advantage of adopting such a format to structuring the affordances of 
a system is that it provides a mechanism for coping with complexity. Figure 2 
illustrates how higher-order affordances can help people to cope with the com-
plexities inherent in the natural environment.  
It should be mentioned that neither the means-ends hierarchy nor the "why-
how-what" model work from the notion of integrative levels (see for instance, 
Bertalanffy, 1968). The model is not truly hierarchical, but is rather a stratified 
model of independent layers with the "totality" of concepts or information 
available at each individual level. In other words, for each level, one dimension, 
or perspective, of the "world" is unfolded. Because the model is not truly hier-
archical, the relations between the levels are not essentially nor logically given 
(partition, inheritance, etc.). They are given by the demands (constraints) of the 
work domain, and they are dynamically created and performed, mentally, 
physically, emotionally etc. by the actors, as modeled through the generic over-
lay:  "why"-"what"-"how".3 
 
1. Value Properties: Purpose, Goal 
Survival Pleasure Altruism  
2. Priorities: Abstract Function  
Reward Danger Nutrition Manufacture 
Cooperation Nurturing Copulation Privacy 
Comfort Pain   
3. Context: General Function  
Communicating Warmth Drinking Eating 
Washing Bathing Injury Support 
Fighting  Shelter Aiding Punishment 
Locomotion    












cle Lifting  
5. Objects and Background: Physical Form  
Layouts Objects Surfaces Substances 
Figure 2. Affordances structured within the means-end hierarchy 
                                                     
3 E. Gerson has recently formulated an overview of hierarchical representations of work, and 
common information spaces in particular (Gerson, E.M.: Different parts for different smarts: 
partonomies and the organization of work. Position paper for the workshop Cooperative Or-
ganization of Common Information Spaces, 23-25 August, 2000, CIT, DTU/arranged by K. 
Schmidt. Available from: gerson@ieee.org) 
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Through this mapping of Gibson's affordances to the means-ends hierarchy, 
Rasmussen and Vicente formulated a model for coupling the actors' direct per-
ception and action to a multidimensional and dynamic exploration and under-
standing of the environment. This model, together with the skills-rules-
knowledge model, SRK, is the core theoretical framework for Ecological Inter-
face Design. It is the basis for the development of the fundamental design prin-
ciples of EID, as formulated by Vicente & Rasmussen (1992): 
 
• Support of skill-based behaviour (SBB) 
• Support of rule-based behaviour (RBB) 
• Support of knowledge-based behaviour (KBB) 
 
Briefly stated, the SBB principle addresses support of a skilled actor, where the 
displays of the interface are arranged to represent the different levels constitut-
ing the totality of actors' situational skills, following Rasmussen's concept of 
skill-based behaviour as a gradual aggregation of singular physical movements 
or cognitive processes. The RBB principle is to provide a consistent one-to-one 
mapping between the work domain constraints and the cues or signs provided in 
the interface. This principle is to support the actors' cognitive control of her 
goal-directed behaviour through displaying perceptual and diagnostic cues for 
changes in the environment, like changes in the state of a power plant. Through 
displays (visual, audible etc.) of the states of the system and the environment, 
together with their associated action possibilities, the actor would not need to 
recourse to knowledge-based behaviour. The RBB design principle is in particu-
lar crucial in high-risk work domains and situations requiring continual aware-
ness and fast intervention, for instance within aviation and power plant control. 
Finally, the KBB principle is to represent the work domain in the form of a 
means-ends hierarchy to serve as an externalised mental model for the actor. 
4.3 Affordances are intentional: developing the 
early principles of Ecological Information Systems 
(EIS) 
Vicente has recently pointed out that there is presently some confusion in the 
literature, with regard to the definition and application of the EID approach 
(Vicente, 1999). Vicente mentions the so-called ecological approach to human 
factors (Flach, Hancock, Caird & Vicente, 1995) as a broad, cross-disciplinary 
research endeavour, exploring Gibson's ecological theory for many diverse ap-
plication domains, for instance architecture and industrial design (furniture etc.). 
While EID contributes to the meta-theoretical endeavours of the ecological ap-
proach to human factors, it is, according to Vicente, narrower in scope. The fo-
cus of EID is specifically on the problem of how to design human-computer 
interfaces for complex socio-technical systems. Vicente discusses Ecological 
Information Systems (EIS) as a related approach, with respect to the application 
domain of complex socio-technical systems, and to some degree, as regards 
methodological framework applied (SRK and means-ends analysis, empirical 
work analysis).  
As Vicente rightly mentions, EIS in particular explores the application of eco-
logical design principles for loosely coupled work domains with a high degree 
of strategic task uncertainty and self-organisation, where the actors' levels of 
control, learning, strategies and tasks are crucial units of analysis. This approach 
was developed in the context of Risø's long-term research program on informa-
tion retrieval and classification, initiated by Pejtersen (1980, 1994). This latter 
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research program grew out of Pejtersen's development of empirically grounded 
methods and concepts for work analysis and tools to support fiction mediation 
in libraries, including domain-specific classification schemes and conceptual 
tools for capturing the actors' work tasks, strategies and preferences. Likewise, 
the results of Pejtersen's empirical work analysis of humanistic knowledge do-
mains were integrated with the results of Risø's work analyses of other complex 
domains, ranging from tightly coupled domains like power plant control to 
more loosely coupled domains like case-handling and hospitals. The aim of this 
integration was to explore the potential for a broad methodological framework 
for work domain analysis, design and evaluation. Important results comprise a 
taxonomy for cognitive work analysis (Rasmussen, Pejtersen & Schmidt, 1990) 
and a new framework for Cognitive Systems Engineering (CSE) (Rasmussen, 
Pejtersen & Goodstein 1994). Risøs framework systematically guides the de-
signer in analysis of work domains, actors and action possibilities, design of 
ecological interfaces using Gibson's theory of direct perception, and provides 
maps for possible interface designs and evaluations. Ecological Information 
Systems (EIS) are systems developed from this approach. 
Structured affordance spaces in EIS 
An important design rationale in the EIS approach is the notion that actors have 
the ability to directly perceive the state of affairs in the environment, given that 
the information is present in a proper format. In order to do this, the interface of 
a system must be transparent in the sense that the deep structure of the work is 
accessible to direct perception as an affordance space in a Gibsonean sense (see 
for instance, Rasmussen, Pejtersen & Goodstein, 1994, pp. 123-134; Pejtersen 
& Rasmussen, 1997). By "deep structure" of the work domain is meant the 
means-ends multi-dimensional properties of the work domain.  Furthermore, the 
interface must support the levels of cognitive control at which the actors choose 
to perform (following the SRK model). The ecological interface couples all the 
means-ends levels of the work environment with the three levels of cognitive 
control. The intent is to allow the actors to dynamically switch their attention 
focus and control:  
 
"In Gibson's terms, the designer must create a virtual ecology, which 
maps the relational invariants of the work system onto the interface in 
such a way that the actor can read the relevant affordances for action" 
(Rasmussen, Pejtersen & Goodstein, 1994, p. 129; our underlining). 
 
By "relational invariance" is meant situations where the relation between two or 
more properties or cues of the interface is invariant, where "absolute invariance" 
applies when one single property or cue is invariant. For EIS, "relational invari-
ance" should not be understood in an absolute sense of universal relational in-
variants, but rather as recurrent situational couplings between invariants in the 
work domain ("sources of regularity") and invariants in the actors' task strate-
gies and intentions. Affordances, then, is defined is as "cues for action rele-
vance" (Rasmussen etc. 1994, p. 129-134). 
EIS separates the representation of the work domain in terms of means and 
ends and task strategies on the one hand, and the actors' resources, background 
and preferences on the other hand. Together, the two types of representations 
constitute a "dynamic world model" for the actor. Invariants and invariant struc-
tures are identified for the work domain as well as for the actors through em-
pirical work domain analysis. The generic invariant structure of the work do-
main is primarily identified through means-ends analysis. The recurrent invari-
ants of the actors are identified through analysis of prototypical tasks and task 
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decisions and through an analysis of the actors' professional and personal means 
and ends. This design principle is to ensure that the actors can be provided with 
action alternatives within prototypical task decision situations. The ecological 
information system supports the actor by displaying not only the overall work 
domain context, but also how and where their particular prototypical tasks and 
decisions perform.  
EIS and loosely coupled domains 
As a loosely coupled domain, the humanities constitute a specific application 
area for the disciplines involved in information system design. For instance, 
Information Studies address the humanities as a knowledge domain with high 
diversity in the conditions for knowledge production and documentation (para-
digms, primary units of analysis, basic concepts, etc.), and hence, high diversity 
in requirements for the design of information systems. This diversity of knowl-
edge production and mediation of the humanities has been explored by Pe-
jtersen (1980, 1997) in her development of a grounded methodology for fiction 
mediation, retrieval and classification. The main research perspective within the 
humanities is the interpretative knowledge interest (Habermas, 1971), often 
based on historical methods of documentation. The primary sources to knowl-
edge production and sharing are documents (texts, images, etc.), institutions 
(universities, schools, museums, archives etc.) and people (scholars, lay experts 
etc.). Currently, the humanities are gaining interest as an application area within 
international and national initiatives for networked access to cultural heritage in 
archives, libraries and museums, thus involving a variety of disciplines ranging 
from Computer Science, Information Studies, Linguistics to Engineering.  
For networked environments that link the sites and people of loosely coupled 
domains, there is no object system that can function as a model for the architec-
ture of the information system to be developed. In other words, there is no sin-
gle and/or unified object system in the background that can structure the totality 
of context for work activity. Collections are distributed across different physical 
sites, ranging from library buildings, museums and archives to online databases 
and web sites on the Internet. Furthermore, the materiality of documents can 
range from paper-based documents such as books, manuscripts, images and 
movies, to electronic documents in databases and on the web. In addition, the 
knowledge background and culture of the actors is highly varied. They range 
from experts in mediation (librarians, archivists, teachers) and experts in the 
knowledge domain (for instance, researchers and teachers) to novices (for in-
stance, adults and children searching for documents for leisure activities, learn-
ing etc.).  
Thus, the overall architecture of an information system created for such 
loosely coupled domains comprised of heterogeneous elements (actors, sites, 
etc.) cannot be derived solely from existing structures and forms of the object 
systems (buildings, databases, organisation of information on web sites, etc.). 
This would correspond to restricting the architecture to the physical or technical 
infrastructure of the work domain. The actors of the work domains of libraries 
and archives contribute to the totality of infrastructure of the work domain. The 
actors contribute as knowledge producers (authors, literature researchers, film 
producers, film critics, etc.), intermediaries (librarians, archivists) and end-users 
(their interests and intentions, and hence, their activities and action possibilities 
will vary and develop within the constraints of their cultural, social and histori-
cal contexts). Thus, such loosely coupled work domains are self-organised. 
Their infrastructure evolves within the constraints of their contributing 
/participating actors, including the constraints of technical possibilities, socio-
historical context and development, policies etc. 
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The architecture of an information system for such loosely coupled and self-
organising work domains, then, should be created from an analysis of their total 
infrastructure, i.e. work domain(s), actors, and the coupling between work do-
main and actors, their constraints and possibilities. Recent empirical and theo-
retical research on infrastructures of loosely coupled domains has identified the 
following levels that are entangled in each other: 
 
1. Technical infrastructure (physical localities and the linking between 
these);  
2. Semantic infrastructure (organization and representations of documents 
and information)  
3. Socio-pragmatic, intentional infrastructure (knowledge and intentions of 
contributing/participating actors and their interrelationships, coordination 
and collaboration forms).4 
 
In his discussion on affordances, Gibson (1979) anticipates the issue of such 
multilevel self-organising systems by addressing the implications of human al-
teration of the natural environment (pp. 129-130): 
 
"This is not a new environment - an artificial environment distinct from 
the natural environment - but the same old environment modified by man. 
It is a mistake to separate the natural from the artificial as if there were 
two environments; artefacts have to be manufactured from natural sub-
stances" (Gibson, 1979, p. 130). 
 
This view by Gibson of artificial environments versus natural environments 
should not be understood in a narrow physicalist sense. Gibson's view of natural 
environments is ecological. This means that it focuses on the co-evolution of 
actors and environments and breaks with previous deterministic and mechanis-
tic views of nature. In this ecological perspective, artificial systems, such as in-
formation systems, are not abstract representations of natural environments. 
Rather, they constitute particular forms of materiality whose creation, through 
manufacturing and design, involve higher order invariants, in the same way as 
invariants evolve in the natural environment. Hence, the invariants of the ecol-
ogy of distributed and loosely coupled work domains are not essentially given, 
but co-evolve through multilevel couplings between actors and the work do-
mains.  
EIS affordance spaces for the actors' strategies and intentions 
In EIS systems, dynamic and structured affordance spaces are developed to 
support the actors' strategies and intentions in work activity. Such affordance 
spaces are not only developed from a means ends analysis of the work domain, 
but also from an analysis of actors' strategies, tasks and intentions. That is, the 
affordance spaces are created from a separate analysis of the deep structure of 
the work domain, from its physical properties to its goals, and from a separate 
analysis of the actors' recurrent behaviour, intentions and strategies (see for ex-
ample Pejtersen & Albrechtsen, 2000; Albrechtsen & Pejtersen, 2000).  
In such dynamic affordance spaces, the actors' knowledge and rule-based be-
havior can be supported through the display of ecological classification 
                                                     
4 . See Star & Ruhlehder, 1996, for an introduction of the concept of information infrastructure 
and the multiple levels of self-organization of heterogeneous, collaborative work domains. 
Likewise, Introna (1997) has described such domains  as self-organizing second order sys-
tems, where the environment is simultaneously a medium and outcome of the interaction. 
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schemes. Ecological classification schemes articulate the semantic and socio-
pragmatic infrastructures constituting the context of the actors' exploration of 
knowledge in work domains. They display the invariant structures, attributes 
and concepts of the work or problem domain together with recurrent and dy-
namic relational invariant structures, attributes and concepts of the actors' task 
strategies and intentions. 
For instance, Pejtersen developed a generic multidimensional ecological clas-
sification scheme for fiction retrieval (1980), providing a structured affordance 
space for actors' knowledge based behaviour. The dimensions of this scheme 
correspond to the invariant structures of knowledge and interests in fiction that 
were found during the actors' interaction, communication and coordination of 
mediation activity. In addition, an ecological actor specific scheme was created, 
based on an SRK analysis of the actors' tasks, preferences and information 
needs. In order to support the actors' choice of action alternatives at the knowl-
edge-based and rule-based level, a number of different displays of invariant 
structures and relational invariants for the problem domain of fiction retrieval 
were created. The actors' coupling and switching between such structured affor-
dance spaces constitute the situation-specific/dynamic world model of fiction 
for the actors. 
The EIS principle of creating an affordance space supporting the actors' di-
verse levels of control from skills-based to knowledge-based behaviour is re-
lated the EID concept of supporting actors with a mechanism to reduce com-
plexity. However, within the loosely domains that EIS in particular addresses, 
the actors have high degree of freedom and action possibilities. Therefore, the 
analysis and representation of the actors' levels of control, as articulated for in-
stance in ecological classification schemes, is far more extensive and detailed as 
compared with more tightly coupled domains like process control. As Vicente 
(1999) has recently pointed out, the EIS approach expands the original EID ap-
proach by supporting the actor's strategies and intentions at all three SRK levels. 
Furthermore, where EID addresses analysis, design and evaluation for experts 
only, EIS is directed to experts as well as novices within a work domain. 
One EIS idea is that it would be useful to have perception and action occur at 
the same level. For example, in structured high-level affordance spaces like eco-
logical classification schemes, the actors' control of the system could proceed at 
any level of the means-ends representation. One can envisage a structure of dis-
play screens corresponding to the various levels of the means-end hierarchy, 
and within each screen, perception and action would be directly coupled at the 
same level of representation. To implement this idea, a control algorithm could 
be constructed to deal with the degrees of freedom problem associated with im-
plementing a command at a high level of abstraction.  
Future work: Affordances are social intentions - ECIS 
EIS utilizes Gibson's ideas of direct perception-action for the design of ecologi-
cal interfaces with high-level affordance spaces for loosely coupled domains, 
based on the grounded methodological approach of the CSE framework for do-
main and actor analysis. EIS's concepts developed from empirical studies of 
individual work activity, but has contributed to the study of cooperative work in 
hospitals, manufacturing and libraries. Risø's current EIS research is focused on 
work domains with collaborating, autonomous actors (teams and self-organising 
groups of actors), where the actors' intentions are constrained by intentional 
structures such as company policies, national regulations, etc. This research 
aims at elaborating the CSE framework with new systematic methods for analy-
sis of cooperative work and design of ecological collaborative information sys-
tems (ECIS). This means that new tools are being developed for analysis, mod-
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elling and representation of the socio-technical complexity involved in distrib-
uted and self-organising collaborative work. The goal is to develop concepts 
and tools for the design of dynamic social affordance spaces in interfaces that 
can support the actors' coordination, knowledge sharing and communication in 
work. Furthermore, the goal is to develop concepts and tools for collaborating 
actors' co-creation and use of a shared dynamic and structured affordance space. 
5 Discussion 
The notion of affordances has been defined and applied from a variety of theo-
retical and empirical perspectives within HMI. The most known generic HMI 
definitions have been put forward by Norman and Gaver (Norman, 1986, Gaver, 
1991) as follows: 
 
• "Properties of the world that are compatible with and relevant for the ac-
tors' interaction, which, when perceptible, offer a link between the actors' 
perception and action" (Gaver) 
 
• "Physical properties are stable properties that the designer adds to the in-
terface to support human-computer interaction, based on a conceptual 
model of the system and actor. Symbols and constraints are not affor-
dances, because conventions for such aspects of the world develop, 
whereas affordances do not" (Norman). 
5.1 Applications of Gibson's affordance concept in 
HMI - advantages and disadvantages 
Gaver's and Norman's definitions of affordances are "classic" contributions to 
the application of Gibson's ecological theory for HMI and are widely applied 
for design and evaluation of interfaces. However, the definitions imply that af-
fordances are more or less equivalent to add-on surface phenomena in inter-
faces. While these definitions have the strength of generality and universality, 
they simultaneously imply detachment from the actors' situational use contexts. 
In particular, Norman's notion implies a rather reductionist perspective on af-
fordances as static features or objects of the world/system etc., rather than dy-
namic properties affording action. Gibson, on the other hand, rejected the notion 
that the environment, objects, actors, etc. are essentially or causally given and 
amenable to universal attribute description and categorisation. Gibson, however, 
does to some degree follow an essentialist line of thought in his assumption of 
invariants as "hidden structures" of the environment, constituting the context for 
information pick-up. Nonetheless, Gibson did not define affordances as inherent 
features of the environment nor of the actor, but as dynamic elements evolving 
through the situational coupling between actor and environment. 
Contrary to Norman and Gaver's notions of affordances, Activity Theory and 
Cognitive Systems Engineering emphasise affordances as specific to human 
work activity and its socio-historical, cultural and organisational dimensions, 
goals and constraints. These latter dimensions of work activity are crucial back-
grounds, and hence, important units of analysis, addressed by these approaches. 
According to these approaches, then, affordances are not viewed as merely 
physical properties of the world, interface, system, etc. Rather, affordances are 
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viewed as properties of the work environment, including computer systems, 
properties that support intentional or purposeful action at different levels. These 
levels range from high level understanding and reflections of the overall goal of 
an activity to more unconscious operations. Overall, according to Activity The-
ory and Cognitive Systems Engineering, affordances evolve dynamically, are 
embedded in socio-cultural contexts and are not essentially nor causally given.  
5.2 Conceptual and intentional affordances 
According to activity theory, the relation between the actor and the environment 
is dynamic, and hence the focus is on biological, historical and individual de-
velopment. Human activity is mediated, for instance through language and arte-
facts. Human activity is purposeful or goal-directed. The actor's work, as medi-
ated through the artefact, is carried out as operations, actions and activity. Hu-
man-machine interaction cannot be understood without an understanding of the 
purpose of the actor's activity and its socio-historical context. According to ac-
tivity theory, affordances of an artefact are reflections of socio-historical devel-
opments and contexts. Thereby, affordances are not essentially given, nor do 
they merely reflect physical properties in a narrow sense. Furthermore, the ac-
tor's perception and information pickup is an effect of her learning process in 
activity, including the use of tools, and therefore, affordances are only affor-
dances as long as they are understood and ready to hand or are within the actor's 
zone of proximal development. Thus, according to the activity theoretical ap-
proach, affordances of tools, as for instance computer systems, must be de-
signed in close cooperation with the users. Firstly to detect socio-historical di-
mension of existing tool and the usual way of carrying out work in a collabora-
tive way. Secondly to detect which part of the work should be delegated to the 
computers and which part should remain in the sphere of human operations. 
Thirdly to design new tools with a democratic perspective in mind.  
Cognitive Systems Engineering sees the relation between the actor and the 
environment as mediated by a dynamic world model. This model constitutes an 
interpretative layer between information pick-up and action, which performs at 
a conscious or unconscious level, depending on the actor's relative skills, rules 
and knowledge (SRK) in a particular work situation or work domain. The dy-
namic world model evolves through the situational coupling between the actor 
and the functional properties of work environment and tools, such as computer 
systems. Affordances of information systems are designed on the basis of i) an 
analysis of the invariant functional properties of the work domain, as captured 
through the means-ends model; ii) an analysis of the actors' skills-rules-
knowledge; iii) an analysis of the actors' diverse, but invariant strategies and 
intentions (coupling). Affordances, then, articulate and display to the actor her 
dynamic internal world model, and thereby also articulate dynamic mutuality of 
the actor and work environment. In other words, affordances of information sys-
tems not only function to support skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-based 
behaviour, but also provide an additional layer of "situational meta-knowledge" 
to support the actors' reflections on the outcome of actions and as well as on 
action possibilities. Previously, CSE has defined affordances as "cues for action 
relevance". This definition is in line with Gibson's original theory of direct per-
ception-action. However, Risø's research on ecological information systems 
involves in-depth empirical analysis of work domains and actors from a variety 
of disciplinary perspectives. This means that likely, the previous CSE definition 
of affordances should be extended as follows: "cues for action relevance, dis-
played in the context of a virtual ecology of work". 
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5.3 Perception-action versus interpretation and 
understanding 
According to the AT and CSE approaches for HMI, the primary unit of analysis 
is human work activity and the socio-cultural context in which this activity is 
carried out. Thereby, they emphasise the actors' purposeful activity as the most 
important design rationale. CSE, and EIS, in particular, has incrementally inte-
grated results from field studies with the models such as means-ends, SRK and 
the taxonomy for cognitive work analysis, together the application of Gibson's 
ecological theory. The hypothesis is that it is possible to recreate the ecology of 
human work activity in information systems. In activity theory focus has been 
on analysing the hierarchy of operations / conditions, actions / goals and activi-
ties / motives. The hypothesis is that it is possible to support human work activ-
ity through information systems by facilitating: i) operations toward the com-
puter application as a physical object, ii) operations for handling aspects of the 
computer application that can be conceptualised into actions and iii) operations 
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Figure 3. Affordances in HMI, Gibsonean theory, activity theory and cognitive 
systems engineering 
 
According to previous views in HMI, notably those that have been put forward 
by Norman and Gaver, affordances are in the foreground, whereas the system or 
work area is in the background. AT and CSE share the view that the actors' per-
ception of foreground and background shifts dynamically according to the ac-
tors' situational context in purposeful activity (see figure 3 below). This concep-
tion by AT and CSE of affordances is in alignment with Gibson's view of the 
necessity of available information (invariants) of affordances in order for their 
perception and pick-up to occur. The shift between the actors' focus on work 
problems and context, tools that mediate their activity and their coordination of 
work activities with other actors performs at several levels of action, communi-
cation and understanding. Hence, AT and CSE follow the original notion by 
Gibson on the actor's dynamic shifting between foreground and background of 
the environment. Furthermore, because their goals are to support several levels 
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of action and interpretation for human activity through information systems, 
they extend Gibson's original ideas to cover more deep semantic and pragmatic 
aspects of the ecology of work. 
6 Future work 
The future research by CHMI on affordances will focus on:  
i) how to extend the original affordance concept to cover design problems for 
social interaction, cooperative work and inter-subjectivity 
ii) how to additionally incorporate the semiotic perspective on affordances 
 
For the first focus of social interaction and cooperative work, our discussions 
will be based on results from the field studies carried out in the three empirical 
projects of the centre on common information spaces, ecological information 
systems, and elastic information systems. Our discussions will also work from 
cross-disciplinary work on common information spaces and collaborative classi-
fication, to which the centre has contributed extensively since the beginning 
with publications, presentations and research topics.  
As regards the second focus of incorporating semiotics, our discussions will 
be based on results from the field studies carried out in the three empirical pro-
jects of the centre. A further basis will be the theoretical results from the discus-
sions of mediation in Activity Theory and Semiotics, as well as on theoretical 
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Abstract (max. 2000 characters) 
For the last decade, the Gibsonian concept of affordances has attracted much attention 
within Human-Machine Interaction (HMI) and related research communities. The appli-
cation of Gibson's ideas in HMI has lead to the notion of direct manipulation of inter-
face objects. Previously, the focus has been on design for low level interaction modali-
ties. To incorporate the concept of affordances in the design of human computer interac-
tion it is necessary to systematically unravel affordances that support human action pos-
sibilities. Furthermore, it is a necessity that Gibson's theory of affordances is supple-
mented by careful analyses of other human modalities and activities than visual percep-
tion. Within HMI two well established perspectives on HMI, Activity Theory (AT) and 
Cognitive Systems Engineering (CSE), have discussed such analyses and design of ac-
tion possibilities focusing on providing computer support for work situations. Within 
these perspectives, the primary unit of analysis in HMI is human work activity and the 
socio-cultural context in which this activity is carried out. Thus, they emphasise the 
actors' purposeful activity as the most important design rationale. According to previous 
views in HMI, notably those that have been put forward by Norman and Gaver, affor-
dances are in the foreground, whereas the system or work area is in the background. AT 
and CSE share the view that the actors' perception of foreground and background shifts 
dynamically according to the actors' situational context in purposeful activity. AT and 
CSE follow the original notion by Gibson on the actor's dynamic shifting between fore-
ground and background of the environment. Furthermore, their work- and actor-centred 
approach to analysis and design of information systems opens up to an extension of 
Gibson's original ideas to cover deeper semantic and pragmatic aspects of the ecology 
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